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The Financial Crisis of 2007-2010 started in the U.S. and speedily was spread 
among the world. Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) had been strongly involved 
in the formation and propagation of the crisis. This study analyses the securitization  
process of CDOs. We review its history with a special emphasis on its role in the recent 
Financial crisis and expose its main problems and advantages. Afterward, we suggest 
possible future usage of CDOs.  
Three different cases are analysed:(i)European Safe Bonds (ESBs), (ii) 
Biomedical research programs and (iii)Microcredit. The cases studies start by introduce 
the industry and expose the existent problem for each situation. After, they follow with 
the presentation of the proposed approach and why CDOs are an appropriate and 
enriching solution exposing the benefits CDOs could bring. Finally are done some 
simulations and illustrations to better explanation and compared the results with 
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 A crise financeira de 2007-2010 começou nos EUA e rapidamente se espalhou 
pelo mundo. Os Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) estiveram fortemente 
envolvidos na formação e propagação da mesma. Neste trabalho vamos apresentar e 
estudar o produto. É analisada a história desde a sua criação, com um ênfase especial 
sobre a sua participação na recente crise financeira e expostos os seus principais 
problemas e vantagens. Numa segunda parte, o trabalho aborda três casos para a 
utilização futura dos CDOs. 
Três diferentes  possibilidades são analisadas: (i) European Safe Bonds (ESBs), 
(ii) Financiamento de programas de pesquisa biomédica e (iii) Microcrédito. Os casos 
de estudo começam por introduzir a indústria e expor o problema existente para cada 
situação. De seguida, os casos seguem com a apresentação da abordagem proposta, 
explicando os benefícios que a utilização dos CDOs trariam e porque é que os CDOs 
são uma apropriada solução para o problema. Por fim são feitas algumas simulações e 
ilustrações para uma melhor compreensão dos benefícios. Os estudos comparam 
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 The theme of this dissertation are the so-called Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs). The text is written in a way that could be understandable by the 
scientific community as well as by the general public. The work uses sources of 
historical information and public knowledge such as web documents, newspapers, 
articles published in scientific journals, statistical data sources, articles from the 
investment banks, books and an Oscar-Winning documentary in order to obtain 
different points of view.  
 Briefly, a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is a financial security whose 
value and income payments depend on a pool of underlying assets. This pool is 
structured, divided and then commercialized in different tranches which have different 
return, risk and priority in payment. During the Financial crisis of 2007-2010, also 
called the “subprime crisis”, securitization and specifically CDOs have been extremely 
criticized. Due to their crisis connection CDOs issuance and commercialization sharply 
declined in succeeding years.  
 The main purpose of this work is to understand and analyse how CDOs 
contributed for the recent Financial crisis, and how to prevent the same mistakes from 
occurring, so that CDOs could be used in the future. The study meets CDOs 
characteristics, and a set of solutions for future use of CDOs.  
 The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a 
background of the existing literature about the different issues addressed. Chapter 3 
presents CDOs and has two subdivisions. It starts by place the topic mentioning the 
CDO structure and characteristics, the most frequent parties in a CDO transaction and 
CDO different types and purposes. Then, section 3.2 follows with the CDOs problems 
that were strongly evidenced in the financial crisis. This section presents the 
development of CDOs since they emerged in the market, with a special focus on its 
involvement in the recent crisis. Here is analyzed why CDO buyers had huge losses, 
some strategy trades that bet and led to CDO defaults and the way CDOs spread the 
crisis among the world. At the end of the section are summarized some of the CDO 
advantages remembering why they became so popular. 
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 In Chapter 4, are studied three possible ways of CDO applications in three 
different areas such as the Eurozone sovereign debt problem, the Drug Research 
financing and the Microcredit. The case studies introduce the industry and expose the 
existent problem for each situation. They reveal how the CDO potentialities can help 
change the industries fate by solving some of its current challenges. Furthermore, these 
studies compare CDOs proposal with alternative proposals, if they exist, and include 
brief hypothetical simulations to CDO utilization exposing its benefits. 
 At last, Chapter 5 exhibits the work conclusions and refers limitations to it and 
to the case studies. It also points some future research that could be done. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 The main purpose of this review is to explain and support theoretically the 
proposed study. To that end are presented the key papers to the different sections and 
some relevant studies pre and post crisis. 
 Regarding the CDOs description, we closely follow the previous documents of 
Mitchell (2004), Bond Market Association (2004) and Hongwen Du et al (2010). We 
also use documents provided by the industry as Duff & Phelps (2008), Kaminker (2003) 
and Hyder (2002). Mitchell (2004) identifies the sources of value creation in the 
structured finance. Bluhm (2003) analyses the main reasons that have supported the 
success of CDOs business.  
 The CDOs problems and its role in the Financial Crisis is analyzed in Barnett-
Hart (2009), that relates the story of the CDO market meltdown, and in the Ferguson 
(2010) Oscar-Winning documentary. There are also studies blaming the credit rating 
agencies by the CDOs misrating such as Benmelech & Dlugosz (2008) and the Griffin 
& Tang (2008; 2012). Others go further and question the role of rating agencies as for 
example Hill (2004) and Partnoy (2006). Malhmann (2013) studies the so-called 
Magnetar trade, a strategy to take advantage of CDO failure. He tests the argument that 
tranches from Magnetar-sponsored CDOs present overly risky investments than non-
Magnetar peers. 
 The sovereign debt problem plagues Europe. It is often approached by the 
European media and opinion articles. Lane (2012), in a more academic way, analyzes 
the European sovereign debt evolution. On the other hand, Shambaugh (2012) provides 
a broader overview of the euro’s economic crisis. The usage of CDOs to solve the 
European sovereign debt problem is a proposal of Brunnermeier et al (2011). It consists 
in the creation of a risk free European bond to stop the contagion in European financial 
banks and states. Farhi et al (2011) also recommend the issuance of European Bonds as 
an alternative reserve asset to US Treasuries. They defend it, to reform the international 
monetary system and to limit the effects of individual and systemic crises.  
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 The use of CDOs to finance Biomedical research comes from an idea of Fagnan 
et al (2013) that  proposed a new industry funding model using financial engineering 
techniques, similar to CDOs, to raise large amounts of capital. The Biomedical research 
owns characteristics that turn its funding in an high risk investment. The review of 
Morgan et al (2011) compiles costs for different time periods and for different group 
diseases. It shows that the costs of a new drug development are very uncertain. 
Furthermore its development follows a lengthy path described by Fagnan et al (2013) 
and Dimasi et al (1991; 2003).  Fagnan et al (2013) focus its proposal in the cancer. 
They conclude that it is a natural application for megafund financing, because it owns a 
group of unique features such as, its long development cycle and its high cost research.   
 Regarding the Microcredit, international institutions, such the United Nations 
and the World Bank, have been trying to develop it. They publish documents regularly 
and had specialized teams. However while quite a lot has been written about 
commercial microfinance and credit derivatives, there is only a very limited literature 
available on the link between the two. Byström (2008) made that link and discussed the 
important role structured finance and credit derivatives could play in helping 
commercial microfinance develop faster. Nevertheless, there is already some studies 
supporting that investing in microfinance may be attractive for investors seeking a 
better risk-return profile. Galema et al (2011) point specifically the Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) from Latin America over from Africa. Krauss & Walter (2008) 
suggest that it adds more portfolio value for international investors than domestic. 
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3. CDOs - Collateralized Debt Obligations 
 3.1 CDOs Structure and Characteristics 
A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is a structured financial instrument that 
owns multiple classes of liabilities created from a pool of assets, the collateral pool, 
which could be static or revolving. Typically the CDO underlying pool contains a 
smaller number of assets (around 100) which are characterized to be fairly 
heterogeneous (Bond Market Association; 2004) (Byström; 2008). Depending on the 
nature of the CDOs underlying assets they could present other denominations: 
Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) for a Collateralized Obligation (CO) backed by 
loans, Collateralized bond obligations (CBO) if it is backed primarily by bonds or even 
Collateralized Fund Obligation (CFO) when the underlying assets are funds.  
The CDO pool could be divided in multiple tranches with different returns and 
level of risk. However the most common shape is three tranches, the Senior, the 
Mezzanine and the Equity or Junior tranche.  
 
The interest and principal payments are made in order of seniority. In other 
words, based on how much cash flow the CDO collects from the collateral pool, first the 
Senior tranche receive its stipulated amount, after that receive the Mezzanine tranche 
and lastly the remaining value goes to the Equity tranche, which deals with a floating 
interest rate. “The way it works is frequently referred to as a waterfall of cash-flows." 
Hongwen Du et al (2010)  
 Consequently, the Senior tranches are considered the safest securities and the 
Junior tranches offer a wish yield, to compensate for the additional default risk. The 
individual assets default risk and the default correlations between them are critical to 
determine the expected distribution losses of the pool. If the pool is well diversified, it 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Figure 1. Collateralized Debt Obligation layout 
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leads to a bigger safety in the Senior tranche. If not, it concentrates the losses, leading to 
less safety in the Senior tranche and could even increase the value of the Equity tranche. 
 The unequal partitioning of risk among the investors is a feature which 
differentiates CDOs from other pooled investments. "Unlike a mutual fund, in which 
investors have rights and risks in proportion to the size of their investment, some CDO 
investors have more rights and greater security than other CDO investors of the same 
transaction." Bond Market Association (2004)   
 CDOs transactions normally involve an asset manager, an investment bank, a 
trustee, rating agencies, investors, an hedge counterpart, a credit enhancer and are 










The SPV works as an independent entity that is legally isolated from the bank 
and is used to isolate financial risk making its obligations secure even if the bank goes 
bankruptcy. The SPV purchases the securities for the underlying pool and split it into 
several tranches (Mitchell; 2004). However these vehicles became a way for chief 
financial officers (CFOs) to hide debt and occult the true company financial health. The 
asset manager primary function is to manage the collateral portfolio shortening or 
strengthen its asset's position according with it investment outlook. The CDO manager 
could be more or less active depending on the prospectus of the CDO and his expertise 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Figure 2. Typical CDO Transaction 
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is essential to the CDO success. Furthermore he receives a management fee by his task 
and wish to own, as much as possible, assets under management. On the other hand, the 
hedge counterpart has the purpose of removing all the non-credit-related risk from the 
CDO transaction. The trustee protects investors’ interests by ensuring that transaction 
covenants are honored, his functions include supervise the asset manager trading, 
distribute the cash among the investors and create and hand out deal surveillance 
reports. The rating agencies assign credit ratings to the CDO tranches based on their 
perceived levels of risk. The credit enhancer receives a fee and his role is to insure that 
senior classes of CDO securities no incur in losses. An investment bank represents a 
multidimensional and crucial role to the creation, but not the ongoing operation, of a 
CDO (Bond Market Association; 2004). It is often, that the same bank will serve as deal 
arranger, underwriter and placement agent. Finally, other vital piece of the transaction, 
the CDO investors. They are typically sophisticated institutional investors, such as 
insurance companies, banks, pension funds or hedge funds.
1
   
 CDO is a broad term that includes several different types of products and can be 
categorized in several ways according with its source of value, collaterals, purpose and 
risk exposition. Cash Flow CDOs concentrate primarily on managing the credit quality 
of the underlying portfolio since its performance is mainly tied to the credit 
performance of the underlying portfolio. Contrary to cash flow CDOs where the 
principal risk is of credit, for a Market value CDO the risk is the price. Market value 
CDO structures are rated based on market value of the collaterals, where current 
collateral market price and price fluctuations are the key performance drivers.  
 According to how a CDO is exposed to Credit risk, it could be classified into 
Cash CDO or Synthetic CDO. If the SPV obtains the credit risk exposure by purchasing 
debt obligations, the CDO is known as Cash CDO. As an alternative, if the SPV does 
not own the debt obligations and obtains the credit risk exposure by selling Credit 
Default Swaps
2
 (CDSs), the CDO is referred as Synthetic CDO (Lucas et al; 2007). In 
                                                             
1 According to Lehman Brother’s estimates, of November 13, 2007, the biggest holders of 
AAA-rated CDO tranches included bond insurers, insurance companies, CDO commercial 
paper, structured investment vehicles (SIV), asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCP), 
and investment banks. 
2 CDSs are essentially insurance contracts protecting against default of specific asset-backed 
securities. 
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turn, the SPV transfer the credit risk to investors via the tranches it issues. In a synthetic 
CDO there is no physical transfer of any asset, the CDS seller receives a periodic 
premium payment and have the obligation of cover the possible credit losses (of the 
CDS purchaser) (Kaminker;2003). Hybrid CDOs are a middle way instrument between 
cash CDOs and synthetic CDOs including both types of assets.  
 Mitchell (2004) argues that tranching only creates value in the presence of 
market imperfections, such as asymmetric information and adverse selection.  In the 
same line of thought Hongwen et al (2010) say that the costs of constructing and 
marketing a CDO would inhibit its creation. However, in practice, the markets are 
imperfect. In light of these imperfections were born two issuance purposes for CDOs: 
spread arbitrage and balance sheet management. (Figure A.1)  
 Banks and other financial institutions have regulatory capital requirements that 
have to accomplish. Basel I required that banks with international presence should hold 
capital of at least 8% of the risk-weighted assets.
3
 Afterward, Basel II modified this 
slightly by imposing different charges based on the riskiness of the asset, often 
determined by the assets’ credit ratings.
4
 (Garcia et al; 2008) These capital requirements 
and the lack of liquidity of individual assets bring the need for banks securitize or sell 
some portion of their assets. The balance-sheet CDO, typically in the form of a CLO, is 
designed to financial institutions achieve a capital relief by removing assets from their 
balance sheets, thereby it allows free up cash and perhaps also increasing the valuation 
of the assets through the securitization (Bluhm; 2003) (Criado & van Rixtel; 2008). 
Arbitrages CDO, on the other hand, seek to capture the positive difference between the 
total cost of acquiring the collateral assets in the secondary market and the value 
obtained in the commercialization of the CDO.  
 
3.2 Role of CDOs in the Financial Crisis – Their Problems and Advantages  
Despite the existence of some earlier reports, it is generally believed that CDOs 
were created in 1987 by bankers of the now defunct American investment bank Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Inc. 
                                                             
3 Note that home country sovereign bonds carried a risk weight of zero. 
4 See Garcia et al (2008) for a deeper explanation of capital requirement calculations. 
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 By the late 1990s the market of CDOs started its expansion. The CDO technique 
already has been understood and was well implemented in the market (Hongwen Du et 
al; 2010). Its issuance volume was rising exponentially and more and more asset classes 
were being used to construct the collateral pool. Furthermore the concept of the CDOs 
was also popularized across Europe (Hyder; 2002). (Figure A.2) 
The original CDOs had mostly static underlying pools; however the growing 
maturity of the CDO market and the increasing number of managers with proven 





 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act decreed that products offered by 
banking institutions could not be regulated as future contracts.
5
 It prevented CDOs from 
being regulated and lies on the root of America's failure in regulate the debt derivatives 
as well as it paved the way for an explosive growth in Synthetic CDO market. 
Thereafter, the volume of traditional Cashflow CDOs has been highly surpassed by 
Synthetic products (Moore; 2004). 
 
 
                                                             
5
 It was signed, in 2000, with the purpose of solve a dispute between the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Nevertheless, 
the result was some overlap between the regulatory scope of both. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of managed synthetic CDOs to static synthetic CDOs, 2000-2003 
Source: Lehman Brothers (in Moore (2004)) 









It seemed that every player was benefiting from CDOs; banks could remove 
loans from their books and the correspondent credit risk through SPV. The rating 
agencies were making record profits, the collaterals managers collected fees and the 
institutional investors were attracted by the apparent safety of senior securities while 
others by the possibility of earn higher yields. (Barnett-Hart; 2009) 
However the CDO market was not what it “promised”. The financial crisis of 
2007-2010 has started from the US subprime mortgage financial crisis and CDOs 
played a decisive role to accentuate and spread it among the world. The existence of a 
SPV allowed the bank not to worry about whether it was repaid and as collateral 
managers looked for ways to earn higher yields, they began to be less restrictive in their 
risk analysis and grant high risk loans (Ferguson; 2010). The risky assets increased its 
quote in the collateral pool, concretely subprime residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), as opposed to corporate bonds (Barnett-Hart; 2009). 
The next development was the repackaging of CDO tranches. Basically, it 
consists in CDOs backed by a pool of other CDO tranches.
6
 In the boom, it would be no 
problem while everyone is getting his payment, however in a default situation the 
damage is promptly spread along the CDO chain.  
Additionally, the CDO market experienced some transformations with the 
arrival of synthetic CDOs. The use of CDS could give the same payoff profile as cash 
CDOs but did not require the same upfront funding (Financial Crisis Inquiry 
                                                             
6 They could be squared or even cubed and are also referred as     . 
Figure 4. Global Issuance of CDOs by motives, 1998-2003 
Source: Lehman Brothers (in Moore (2004)) 
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Commission; 2010). Banks could transfer the credit risk of some assets even without its 
sale. On the other hand, gave CDO managers the freedom to securitize any asset without 
the need to locate, purchase, or own it, allowing a quicker issuance (Barnett-Hart; 
2009). It came accentuate the asymmetric information between issuers and investors.  
Unlike the world of insurance, in derivatives is possible to get insurance for an 
asset that is not possessed. Investors could take short positions and speculate on the 
expected performance of the asset. It produced potential conflicts for CDO collateral 
asset managers. They had to serve the interests of long investors, who were betting that 
mortgage borrowers would continue to make their payments against the short investors 
who were betting the housing market would collapse. 
Synthetic CDOs also enabled pursue more complex trading strategies, like 
capital structure arbitrages. Investors tried to take advantage of the “apparent” general 
mispricing of risk observed in the CDO market. Coval et al (2009), Krahnen & Wilde 
(2009) and Hamerle et al (2009), among others, show that equity tranches was 
undervalued due to systematic risks, not captured by traditional ratings. Investors took 
long positions in equity tranches and at the same time were assuming short positions in 
mezzanine and senior tranches. An example was the investment strategy of the hedge 
funds Paulson & Co. and Magnetar, which apparently consisted in the construction of 
the collateral pool with riskier assets in a way that they could bet that some portions of 




 (Malhmann; 2013). Obviously, they did not have a great 
incentive to monitor the credit risk of the underlying portfolio. 
The rating agencies role is to assign individual asset credit ratings according to 
the expected probability of default and loss rate. However, in a CDO there are no assets 
specifically referring to a unique tranche but rather all assets as the entire collateral asset 
pool becoming their task more complex. Rating agencies were paid by the investments 
banks, being an interested part in that it did not lose its vigour, therefore their lack of 
                                                             
7 Paulson & Co. Inc. had profited billions with the burst of the bubble in the US mortgage 
market by betting against synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
8 Magnetar Capital was actively involved in the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market; 
the firm's arbitrage strategy for CDOs is described as the Magnetar trade. It is under 
investigation however until the end of 2012 has never been charged with wrongdoing. 
(Eaglesham, 2012) 
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independence and regulation led to some facilitation in the assignment ratings (Partnoy; 
2006); (Hill; 2004); (Ferguson; 2010).  
Moreover, with the quality of collateral pools declining and the growing of 
CDOs issuance, the rating agencies came under enormous pressure to quickly decide 
CDO ratings and failed to recognize the amount of risk inherent in these products.  
 
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) 
The CDOs credit analysis became based almost completely on automated 
models, with very little human intervention and incentives to check the accuracy of the 
ratings assigned. (Barnett-Hart; 2009) 
The introduction of a formula named Gaussian Copula as an industry standard to 
price CDOs allowed its easier pricing and also contributed to CDOs explosive issuance. 
But the complex mathematic models that were supposed to protect investors against 
risk, were not working. The formula has a poor representation of extreme events and 
was misunderstood by the analysts. David X. Li, the creator of the Gaussian formula, 
even stated about his formula to The Wall Street Journal in 2005 that "very few people 
understand the essence of the model." (Salmon; 2009) 
Still regarding CDOs rating, Griffin & Tang (2008) detect evidence of 
assumption errors, misleading inputs, and conflicts of interests affecting it. The same 
authors, Griffin & Tang (2012) conclude that a credit rating agency frequently made 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 5. Global CDO issuance, 2000-2012 (USD Millions) 
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Concluding it was the combination of market imperfections, irresponsible 
underwriting practices, absence of ethic, misaligned incentives, deregulation, flawed 
credit rating procedures, human excesses and the securitization opacity that spawned 
this financial monster.
9
 Following the burst of the bubble of housing market in the 
United States, losses in CDOs started spreading among the world. One failure in the 
web starts to drag down the rest of the system; companies only find out are involved 
when a company near itself has begun to collapse. It was difficult to stop the losses 
because the giant amount of money channeled to CDO market, its complexity and the 
proliferation of derivatives.  
After the crisis, occurred a natural “freeze” in CDO market with its issuance 
sharply declining. Nowadays, it already verifies a shy recuperation (see Figure 5). 
However, CDOs also offer many advantages. The diversification of assets and 
tranches they offer and the ability to increase some assets liquidity were essential to 
their explosive growing. The next table concentrates the main CDOs disadvantages and 









                                                             
9
 Everyone involved only was interested in maximize its profit independently of the 
credit quality. “Inside Job”, an Oscar-Winning documentary about the financial crisis of 2007-
2010, contains testimonials from people who knew they were building something that could 
have very dangerous consequences. (Ferguson; 2010) 
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Facility to lead with non-standard 
assets. 
Opacity of assets 
Ability to customize a security in a way 
that fits the investor risk-reward profile. 
Balance-Sheet Purposes 
CDOs could own a large range of 
tranches. They could provide very 
attractive yields as well as an extreme 
secure investment. 
Rating Complexity 
Capacity to attract large flows of capital 
in a short period of time. 
Wrong incentives\Speculation 
Via a single investment, offer investors 
the diversification among a wide 
number of assets. 
Construction, Issuing and Managing 
Costs 
CDOs allow banks to get liquidity.  
They could sell off some assets, 
otherwise non-tradable, freeing up 
capital to invest or loan. 
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4. CDOs Case Studies 
In this section are presented three possible applications: (i)European Safe Bonds 
(ESBs), (ii)Biomedical research programs and (iii)Microcredit.  
CDOs have played a central role in the recent financial crisis, nonetheless, with 
the right incentives and financial structure, tremendous amounts of capital can be 
gathered in a relatively short period of time. Although, the financial crisis, led to a 
backlash of skepticism here we present three possible positive applications of such 
structures to overcome existing financial problems.  
The main aim of these case studies are to show that rather than, stay away from 
such techniques, a more sensible response is to acknowledge CDOs strengths and 
address their weaknesses, using them wisely and responsibly.  
4.1 European Safe Bonds (ESBs) 
4.1.1 Existent Problem 
Even if the 2007-2010 financial crisis was not European in nature, the slow 
economic growth of some euro area countries, its financial and external imbalances and 
the lack of a banking and fiscal union, dragged them for it. (Lane; 2012) 
 The Eurozone is currently dipped in a Sovereign Debt Crisis. The European' 
Stability and Growth Pact set limits on the size of annual budget deficits at 3 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a total public debt of 60 percent of GDP, however 
it was not accomplished by many countries. (Table A.I and Table A.II)  
The risk weights according to Basel are zero for all sovereign bonds. Bank 
regulators following the Basel Criteria have treated all the Eurozone sovereign bonds as 
equally safe, even though they have been treated differently by the market. Encouraged 
by the absence of any regulatory discrimination among bonds, European banks hold too 
much of their national debts, instead a prudent diversification. Furthermore, markets for 
Eurozone sovereign debt are severely distorted, verifying a capital flight from the 
periphery countries for the more central ones. In spite of the countries own the same 
coin appear there is two-speed inside euro area.  
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Investors started to doubt if peripheral sovereign states will be bailed out or not, 
at the same time, they also started to speculate on the solvency of their banks. 
Sovereigns in turn, face a constant risk of having to rescue their banks, also get a risk 
increase in their bonds. It led their sovereign debt risk and their banking solvency risk 
entering to a diabolic loop. Greece was the first country to be shut out of the bond 
market in May 2010, with Ireland following in November 2010, Portugal in April 2011 







The explosive growth in the developing world during the last two decades and 
the recent strong volatility in financial markets have increased the demand for safe 
assets.
10
 They are an essential mechanism to smooth the income intertemporally. 
Households seek a non-risky way to transfer their buying power over time and to plan 
their future needs. Institutional investors, like pension funds, to accomplish their future 
responsibilities. The banks need them to make the link between their assets’ risk and 
their capital. On the other hand, they are essential to central banks conduct their 
monetary policies. (Farhi et al; 2011) 
However, in spite of being home to one of the worlds' reserve currencies, Europe 
does not supply a safe asset that rivals U.S. Treasuries Bills. Moreover, the problem 
cannot be solved by national currency devaluation. The monetary union switches off 
this traditional adjustment mechanism. (Daniel & Shiamptanis; 2010)  
 
                                                             
10 A safe asset should be liquid, has a minimal risk of default and be denominated in a stable 
purchasing power currency. 
Figure 6. Diabolic loop between Sovereign debt risk and Banking debt risk 
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4.1.2 Proposed Approach 
Thereby, to solve the European sovereign debt problem, arise the European Safe 
Bonds (ESBs). The proposal is based in three basic premises, that European financial 
systems and states are caught in a diabolical loop, markets for Eurozone sovereign debt 
are severely distorted, and the world lack of safe assets. The introduction of ESBs 
requires changes in bank regulation and the creation of an European Debt Agency 
(EDA) (Brunnermeier et al; 2011). 
The main changes are that regulators should give a zero risk weight at ESBs, but 
not automatically to sovereign bonds. European Central Bank (ECB) would accept 
ESBs in its main operations. It still would hold sovereign bonds as assets, but now 
indirectly via the ESBs. EDA would buy sovereign debt of each country in the euro 
area, totalizing 60% of the Eurozone GDP. Each country would represent a fraction 
correspondent to its GDP average percentage, during the last five years, in total EZ 
GDP. The sovereign debts would be used as collaterals by the EDA to issue two 
securities: European safe bonds (ESBs) and European junior bonds (EJB). ESBs 
correspond to 70% of the total issued. The payment working mechanism is identical to a 






If the income from the pool is not enough to pay off the ESBs, the EDA would 
hold a reserve capital, similar at the existing European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), to answer for the deficit.  Concluding, any failure by a sovereign state 
to honor in full its debts would be absorbed first by the holders of the junior tranche 
security; ESBs only suffer losses when the EJB and the credit enhancement barrier are 
surpassed. 
Figure 7. CDO proposed by Euro-nomics Group 
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Some benefits of the proposal stem from the introduction of ESBs, while others 
stem from changes in bank regulation and still others from the interaction of the two.  
ESBs introduction and bank regulation changes would assign appropriate risk 
weights to sovereign bonds, eliminating the present mispricing of European sovereign 
bonds. ESBs would be liquid, as they would be issued in large volumes, and freely 
traded in the market. 
They increase the supply of safe assets and provide Europe with a European-
wide safe asset. If banks held such an asset, it would avoid the overexposure to national 
bonds. The contagion from sovereign bonds to banks would be greatly mitigated 
breaking the diabolical loop. If, in addition, there were a Europe-wide risky counterpart 
to this asset (EJB), then the capital fleeing to safety across geographical regions, is 
replaced by a flight to safety across tranches (Shambaugh; 2012). This would stop the 
capital flows from the periphery to the center of Europe and their associated sovereign 
debt relative-price distortions. 
ESBs also increase the "safe haven" premium that investors are willing to pay 
for safety and liquidity. Currently, it is mostly captured by Germany. ESBs would share 
it across countries that are as safe but not as liquid, like Austria, Finland, and the 
Netherlands, and with countries that are not safe at all, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Italy and Spain. 
It appears there are two groups of correlated bonds inside the Eurozone (Diário 
Económico; 2013). The diversification arising from this bundling of sovereign bonds 
allows take advantage of its correlation. (Table A.III) Furthermore, it is important to 
refer that unlike the opacity of securitization in the financial crisis, in ESBs the 
collateral composition is totally clear and from public knowledge. 
Finally, since ESBs would be issued at different maturities, would have an 
additional benefit: the establishment of a true euro yield curve. It is currently missing in 
Europe and can serve to the European Central Bank (ECB) conduct its monetary policy 
and as reference for a variety of pricing and hedging needs.  
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Concluding, ESBs are designed to minimize default risk and its main purpose is 
to create an European safe asset. The safety is provided by the EJB, the pooling and the 
credit enhancement. 
ESBs proposal would not solve all the many problems of the European 
economies, but by breaking the diabolical loop and preventing sudden stops, it would go 
to the heart of what has driven the crisis of the last years. It would stop the sharp rise in 
periphery countries yields and allow that its competitiveness and public debts problems 
could then be dealt over time, allowing them to be more carefully thought. (Shambaugh; 
2012) 
4.1.3 Some Numerical Results 
In order to attest the safety of ESBs, we realize some simulations. They have to 
recreate the dependency among the different EZ sovereign debts as well as the threat of 
contagion if a country defaults. Since the credibility of the simulations lies essentially in 
the capacity of the model to resemble the propagation of default, I started a research to 
find models that allowing me construct mechanisms to estimate dependent joint default 
probabilities. 
Given that, this CDO is constituted by a considerable number of assets, 
heterogeneous both in weight and probability of default; it increases the difficulty to 
calculate the number of defaults as to identify which assets were to go into default. I 
also face others constraints to find a model: the high asset correlation, the high 
complexity of stochastic models, the almost absence of models addressing correlated 
defaults in monetary unions, its variables and computational skills requirements and my 
own statistical knowledge. Moreover, it is not known the default distributions limiting 
the use of jump intensity models and some copulas. Additionally, the lack of data about 
country defaults does not allow to test the model adaptation to the data.  
Taking into account these limitations, we select four different procedures to 
execute it: by the independent probabilities of default, by generate correlated random 
probabilities, by the use of the Ali-Mikhail-Haq Copula (Ali et al; 1978) and by the 
Davis-Lo Contagion Model (Davis & Lo; 2001). The methods would be explained by 
this order. These models were selected due to its diversity and to confront ESBs against 
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a significant number of possible events that could occur. The first is an independent 
process and the remaining three are dependent processes. 
To perform these simulations, it is necessary extract the euro-countries GDP to 
compute its weights in the CDO tranches. To obtain the default probabilities are used 
the euro-countries alphanumerical ratings and respective cumulative 10 years default 
rate. (Table A.IV and Table A.V) Lastly, in the absence of recovery rates for sovereigns 
states, it is adopted an analogous recovery rate, the moody’s rate for Non-Financial 
Corporate-Senior Secured bond, evaluated in 49.3%. (Figure A.3) 
The first method passes by simulate random numbers that follow a uniform 
distribution (unif(0,1)), when the country default probability is lower than its respective 
number the country does not enter in default, if not the country enters in default. (Table 
A.VI) 
To the last three ways, we utilize the 10 years CDS daily prices of EZ countries 
to estimate its correlation default. (Table A.VII and Figure A.4) The first dependent 
process consisted in generate correlated numbers to simulate possible correlated 
scenarios. It applies the same mechanism of default of the independent process. The 
generated numbers were modeled by the default correlation matrix and this process 
could be observed in annex step by step. (Table A.VIII) These numbers are similar at 
the independent process numbers however, as expected, its standard deviation is lower 
than in the uniform distribution. (14,79% vs 28,87%)  
The last two processes follow two previous procedures: Ali-Mikhail-Haq copula 
and Davis-Lo's Contagion Model. Davis & Lo (2001), introduced to the credit risk field 
the contagion models, where the assets may default either directly or indirectly, infected 
by other asset default. Ali et al (1978) created a Copula that approaches the joint 
probabilities of correlated events given the marginal probabilities. 
In the second dependent process we utilized a Copula introduced by Ali et al 
(1978) as a way to do the bridge between marginal probabilities and the dependent joint 
probabilities. (Figure A.5) First is calculated and observed if some country enters in 
default. Subsequently, depending on the defaults occurred, is calculated the new total 
default probability for each country, modeled by the copula. To calculate the new 
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default probability it was necessary assume the average default correlation value as 
standard to the "A" and "B" correlation. The correlation is impossible of be measured 
when there are more than one independent default. It results that the lower the 
probability of independent defaults and it occurs, the greater the new default 
probabilities. In the third and last dependent process, is used the Davis & Lo's (2001) 
contagion model with a slight modification. The model is used to recreate a possible 
domino or chain reaction effect. For the assets in question did not make sense the 
default of a country directly imply the default of another neither all the assets have the 
same contagion effect. Consequently, in our simulation, the country contagion link only 
is activated when its CDS prices and its yields have a positive correlation and instead 
take simply values of a Bernoulli Random variable, it will take the default correlation. 
(Figure A.6 and A.7) 
However, these two processes have the limitation of being one step model, since 
they depend on past events. That is, just give us the probability of default to a certain 
period and if the infection is not stopped suddenly, it will most likely lead to default of 
all countries and have to be made more steps. (Figure A.8) 
In sum, each one of these processes had around 2000 simulation, totalizing 
millions of possible cases, once the final results are obtained by a vast path of 
combinations. There were only 9 cases in that the ESB did not reveal safe and these 
cases could be solved by the credit enhancement. The EJB average loss was from 4.31% 
to 46.43%.   




Figure 8. ESB Simulations Results 
 





Comparing with the Eurobonds, the alternative proposal more known, ESBs also 
gain advantage. Briefly the Eurobonds proposal involves joint and several liabilities by 
all member states of the Eurozone and replaces their sovereign bonds. Consequently, all 
member states will face the same interest rate and each one have to be ready to step in 
with extra payments if other members fail to do so. Unlike Eurobonds, ESBs can be 
implemented under existing European treaties and would not require more fiscal 
integration than already in place. They are easier to implement or to undo in case of 
failure, there is no common bailout structure and thus do not distort the incentives of 
individual member states. Also contrasting with the Eurobonds, ESBs provide market 
discipline and avoid free rider problems. Countries continue to get signs from the 
market, given that, always a country' public debt surpass approximately 60% of its 
GDP, it would need to get financing in the markets (Brunnermeier et al; 2012).  
Table II. Comparison: ESB Vs Eurobonds  
Comparison Points ESB Eurobonds 
Diabolic Loop Broken Broken if Eurobonds are safe 
Safe Asset Large Unknown, but less safe 
Flight to Safety Redirected Inexistent 
Market discipline Yes Inexistent 
Launch Time Next month Years 
Flexibility Large Require a deep fiscal union 
In Case of Failure Easy to undo Difficult to undo 
Hidden transfers Inexistent Yes 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
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4.2 Drug Research  
 4.2.1 Existent Problem 
 The pharmaceutical industry, at heart, dedicates to develop, produce, and apply 
new drugs to improve human health. This challenge involves thousands of 
organizations, since small medical device start-ups to giant biotechnology firms and 
from private research institutes to great universities. 
 However there is a big cultural gap between scientific research and commercial 
enterprise. In science, the success is achieved by peer review and measured in 
reputation, while in business score is kept by capital markets and measured by the 
profitability (Pisano; 2010). Moreover, since people's lives are a sensible issue, the 
industry also deals with conflicting non-pecuniary motivations and public-policy 
implications.  
 The introduction of a new drug development is a time-consuming, complex, 
sequential and a highly regulated process. Countries typically have national agencies 
responsible for authorizing new compounds for sale and to protect the intellectual 
property. 
 Normally, in the U.S, the lifecycle of a new drug development follows the path 
described below (Dimasi et al; 1991) (Dimasi et al; 2003). In the “Preclinical Phase” the 
company develop the drug tests in animal trials, until to permit the compound to 
proceed to human studies. Following this phase, the sponsoring company files an 
“Investigational New Drug” (IND) application. If the U.S. Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA) approves it, the drug moves into Phase I. Here the drug is tested in a small 
number of healthy volunteers to establish safe dosages and to gather information of 
body reactions. If the drug is determined to be too toxic or otherwise unfit, it is 
withdrawn.  
 Compounds that successfully pass Phase I move into Phase II, where the tests 
are conducted with a patient population that already has the targeted disease or 
condition. Still, in Phase II, in order to obtain evidence on safety and on compound's 
efficacy, are defined a set of endpoints to compare with the results from the trials in 
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diseased patients. Following the successful completion of Phase II, the drug moves into 
the final pre-approval clinical testing phase, Phase III. At this stage the drug is tested in 
a large sample of patients to uncover side-effects that occur infrequently. Once drug 
developers believe that they have enough evidence of safety and efficacy, they submit 
an application at the regulatory authorities to the drug can enter legally in the market. At 
the end of each phase, the pharmaceutical firm reviews the status of a drug research and 
make a decision on whether to continue with its development. 











 The average time since the synthesis to the approval of a new drug application 
(NDA) has increased significantly, from an average 7.9 years in the 1960s to 12.8 years 
in the 1990s (Dickson and Gagnon; 2004). Much of the increase is due to the 
enlargement of the clinical phase. Dickson and Gagnon (2004) attributed it to a variety 
of factors: the increase in regulatory requirements, the nature of the diseases 
investigated, the need of more studies and the increasing difficulty of recruiting patients 
for clinical trials.   
 According with the review of Morgan et al (2011) and the paper of Dimasi et al 
(2003), the costs of developing a new drug have been increasing. Dimasi et al (2003) 
find that even when the results are compared with an earlier study with a similar 
methodology, the total capitalized costs revealed an increase at the annual rate of 7.4% 
above general price inflation. Moreover, the same study concludes that the drug 
development and clinical costs are quite discrepant depending on the area of disease. 
 Some researchers used processes methodologically strong and have been widely 
cited in future studies as Hansen & Chien (1979) and Dimasi et al (1991). However, 
despite three decades of research in this area, no published estimate to the cost of 
developing a new drug can be considered a gold standard. The fact that the data is kept 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
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in secret by the big pharmaceuticals becomes very difficult to assess validity and 
reliability of the studies.  
 By other side, the project mean returns and the cost of capital for New Chemical 
Entities (NCES), since 1970 to 1994, also had been increasing (Grabowski et al; 2002). 
(Table A.IX) The distribution of sales revenues for new drug compounds is described as 
highly skewed. Grabowski and Vernon (2000a), for NCES introduced between 1988 
and 1992, concluded that the top 10% of drugs accounts for more than half of the 
overall sales generated. The same authors, in other publication, to drugs introduced 
between 1990 and 1995 estimate the effective patent life in 11.7 years (Grabowski & 
Vernon; 2000b). Nowadays, the normal patent period is 20 years in the European 
Union. 
 Moreover, the current business model for life sciences research and development 
is flawed and the productivity of big pharmaceutical companies has been declining in 
last years.
11 Concluding, the industry presents some characteristics that potentiate the 
use of new financing techniques. Biomedical research is complex, expensive, very 
uncertain, lengthy, and there is a big time lag between capital commitment and return. 
 4.2.2 Proposed Aproach 
 Fagnan et al (2013) proposed a new industry funding model that uses financial 
engineering techniques, similar to CDOs, to raise large amounts of capital. The money 
is used by a single Megafund to finance a well-diversified portfolio of biomedical 
research programs. The issued debt is named Research Backed Obligation (RBOs) and 







                                                             
11 See the recent studies of Paul et al (2010) and Pisano (2010). 
Figure 10. Research Backed Obligations (RBOs) 
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 The collateralized assets include the initial capital raised from investors and the 
entire subsequent biomedical R&D acquired, licensed from external entities or created 
internally. Afterwards, all the profits generated by these activities or through sales of 
these assets in later periods are distributed by its different tranches, with the appropriate 
repayment hierarchy. A single entity investing in many diverse programs allow take 
advantage of the benefits of diversification, increasing the research' likelihood of 
success and consequently the risk/reward relation.  
 As CDOs, RBOs also possess its same advantages, but RBOs have a special 
attribute. RBOs work as a natural hedge to big investors such as Pension Funds or 
Insurance Companies. Moreover, RBOs are inserted in the group of Social responsible 
investments (SRI). They could capture investments of companies that want support 
socially relevant activities but are forbidden of investing in equity. (Fagnan et al; 2013) 
 Fagnan et al (2013) also believe that this business model eliminates some fixed 
costs and brings more operating efficiency. The gains are achieved not only through the 
usual economies of scale, but also through: the ability to allocate capital efficiently, the 
possibility of redeploy researchers onto more productive projects, and the abandon of 
less promising projects sooner.  
 Additionally, RBOs also eliminate existents short-term business pressures. They 
extend the investment horizon and reduce the financing risk for the programs in its 
portfolio. By last, but not less important, RBOs could come to create a Social Value 
invaluable. The American Cancer Society, only for U.S., estimate the new cancer cases 
to 2013 in 1 660 290 and the number of deaths approximately 600 000. And the cancer 
is just one of many diseases that affect society. 
 4.2.3 Illustration 
Now, it is presented an example, based in the work of Fagnan et al (2013), of 
how a CDO could be used to potentiate the pharmaceutical industry.  
 Consider a hypothetical, but realistic, drug research project requiring 30 million 
Euros in out-of-pocket costs over a 12 years period. In this period there is no generated 
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revenues. Subsequently, there is an 11 years period to collect the return where is 





 Additionally, it is assumed that the project only have two possibilities, the 
possibility of a drug being developed with or without success, therefore the project has a 
zero recovery rate. I used 10% as the likelihood of success and consequently 90% to be 
an unsuccessful project. As a result, the return only can be evaluated to a 12 years 
analysis, which is when really is perceived if a drug can be inserted in the market. To an 
isolated project, the return follows a Bernoulli Random variable presenting a 
performance of around 4693% with chances of 10 % or of -100% to the remaining 90 % 
of the times. (Figure A.9)   
The low chance of success of a standard drug research project and the 
unpredictability of sales once a product is marketed create a risky business environment. 
It leads investors to move away from the drug research financing as an investment 
opportunity, even if the expected rate of return may be attractive. However if we 
repackage a considerable number of projects of a drug research, the hypothesis of these 
portfolio offer a positive return enlarge.  For example with 100 projects, the probability 
is approximately 99% and this problem is strongly mitigated. Moreover, to one isolated 
project the expected Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is 13.95% and the standard deviation 
is 417.16%. Nevertheless, if are developed 100 projects at the same time the expected 
IRR does not change, while the standard deviation decrease to 41.72%. (Figure A.10, 
A.11 and Table A.X)  
To this illustration was assumed a cost of capital of 12 % and, as simplification,   
no correlation between the chances of success in drug research. The dependence affects 
the return' standard deviation but this assumption is not critical for the main purposes of 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Figure 11. Hypothetical Project Cash Flows (Drug Research) 
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the example. However, in a more specific real-world application, the success 
dependency among projects has to be taken in account.  
In Summary, the high amount needed to finance new researches, and its high 
probability of failure challenge the traditional funding vehicles, which are limited in 
size, scope, and risk appetite. Consequently, Investors, that are risk averse, move away. 
As a result, many projects are not financed. However, CDOs could invert this situation 
and help biomedical research to obtain a bigger scale.  
 
4.3.  MicroCredit 
4.3.1 Existent Problem 
Microfinance deals with a large provision of financial services. Microcredit is its 
most developed sub-discipline. According with United Nations, microcredit can be 
defined as the sustainable supply of small-scale financial services such as credit, savings 
accounts, and insurance to poor and low-income people (United Nations; 2005).  
Microcredit has the power of change the lives of people and revitalizing 
communities worldwide. For example, a 100€ loan is “peanuts” in the developed world, 
but to someone living with one euro per day, that amount could allow them to open its 
own business and strengthening the local economies.  
 There is a huge demand for these services. In developing countries, 
governments and philanthropy aid are not capable of meeting the demand. According to 
the World Bank, only 4 per cent of worldwide demand for microfinance loans was 
being met in 2005 and there was around three billion people seeking access to basic 
financial services in 2006 (World Bank; 2006) (Wardle; 2005). The expected explosive 
growing of world population will surely still make these numbers grow. It is expected 
that the microcredit market grows at 15% per year (Wine; 2005).  
The microcredit has some interesting particularities that could attract the 
financial markets. There are strong reasons to believe that risk-adjusted returns from 
microlending are higher than returns from corresponding traditional lending. A 
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borrower in the developing world, typically, values more the access to a credit than a 
corresponding people in the developed world. Also, in proportional ways, he can 
generate much higher returns on his assets. Consequently, it means that many of these 
developing world’ borrowers can afford to pay higher interest rates for its capital access. 
(Byström; 2008) 
Other potentiality is that the returns from microloans are largely uncorrelated 
with returns from most other asset classes. Krauss & Walter (2008) present some early 
evidence supporting that its inclusion in global portfolios reduces overall portfolio 
volatility. Galema et al (2011) using mean-variance spanning tests, confirm that 
investing in microfinance may be attractive for investors who seek a better risk-return 
profile. Furthermore, since diversification is the only true free lunch in the financial 
world, an asset class that is largely uncorrelated with the major economic and political 
events in the world will attract the interest of rational investors.   
The investments in microcredit give private investors the chance to do well 
(financial scale) by doing good (social scale), being a Social responsible 
investment (SRI). The SRI is especially in vogue in the most developed countries, both 
for companies and for governments, which are concerned with their communities or by 
the way are looked by their communities. (Galema & Lensink; 2009) 
Nowadays, the developed world is more informed how microfinance works in 
developing world. However, to the massive microfinance commercialization could 
move forward still there are numerous hurdles that need to be overcome.  
 The first step is to transform non-governmental organizations into regulated 
banks/financial institutions run by professionals (Byström; 2008). Additionally the 
macro policy and government regulation have to be adapted to accommodate 
commercial microcredit.  
Microfinance Institutions have no possibilities of protecting themselves against 
currency risk. There is an almost absence of adequate hedging mechanisms or are too 
expensive (Ivatury & Abrams; 2005). It is necessary change this, creating effective 
means to mitigate the currency risk and the instability of inflation rates.   
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The microcredit market is big enough and non-commercial players simply do not 
have enough capital to satisfy the demand. However, there is evidence of subsidized 
lending crowding out commercial viable lending. Donors and investors have important 
and complementary roles (World Bank; 2002a). Byström (2008) and de Sousa-Shields 
& Frankiewicz (2004) argue that the principal task of donors should be to support 
institutions with the aim of become microfinance securitization more efficient. 
Subsequently, they have to identify and redirect their funds to the riskiest MFIs, leaving 
the viable lenders to commercial investors. 
Furthermore, microfinance is often perceived as different from conventional 
finance. The nonexistence of MFIs historical defaults by the rating agencies to support a 
precise estimation of their credit risk, as well as the borrowers’ lack of collateral 
become microcredit a riskier way of investing. 
To sum up, Microcredit industry leads, essentially, with these main problems: 
the role of donors and governments and how to satisfy the escalating microcredit 
demand in a way that the microcredit could be commercially viable. 
4.3.2 Proposed Approach 
The arrival on the scene of financial markets/sector is probably the only way to 
reach the billions of people in the world who need finance at reasonable terms but have 
no access to it. CDOs have single characteristics that differentiate them from other 
securities. Henceforward, the focus is on how this particular tool from the world of 
structured finance could potentially speed up the commercialization of microfinance. 
Microcredit CDOs (MiCDOs), like other CDOs, are funds that pool and 
repackage assets, dividing the credit risk among different tranches. The only difference 
is that the underlying pool is composed by microcredit loans. 
BlueOrchard Microfinance Securities I (BOMS), issued in July 2004, is pointed 
as the first formal microcredit CDO. It had a nominal amount equal to $40 million, four 
tranches, a time to maturity of seven years and reached a total of approximately 40,000 
micro-entrepreneurs. (Meehan; 2004) 
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CDOs have the ability to attract big flows of capital to satisfy the increasing 
microcredit demand. Furthermore, microcredit is propitious to the development of 
CDOs. Since, there is an unlimited source of potential assets that, can be pooled 
together, securitized, and sold to investors all around the world. 
Microcredit faces a very different reality depending on the country or region. It 
is a point in favour of CDOs, since they are able to lead with non-standard and non-
rated assets. 
The CDOs tranching mechanism allows overcome some flaws in microcredit 
business, such as the information asymmetries, which are particularly relevant. The 
protection provided by the tranches help to combat the distrust of investors less 
informed. The tranching mechanism also allows to attract a large panoply of investors. 
The safest tranches could be used by investors that normally would never consider, or 
would not be authorized, investing in an emerging market and even less in rural areas 
(Byström; 2007). Then, by other side, CDOs equity tranche can be seen as an alternative 
to real equity (Byström; 2008). The weak corporate governance and the absence of 
stock markets in many developing countries, leads us to a shortage of equity.   
At last, MiCDOs via a single investment are able to diversify its underlying pool 
among a large number of credits and geographical regions, mitigating the risk of 
default.  
4.3.3 Illustration 
Now, a hypothetical, but realistic, example is used to point some of these 
advantages and to attest its viability. Suppose a microcredit CDO that holds a portfolio 
of 10.000 microloans, each with a nominal amount of average 1.000 €. The loans have a 
six years maturity and should be repaid at the maturity. The maturity of our MiCDO is 
not critical for this discussion, however it is in line with microcredit’ short-term loans.
12
  
The interest rates in microcredit could assume a large range of values according 
with the countries (20-80%) (Byström; 2008), for this example, we use 30%. The 
currency risk could be very volatile and is dependent of the weight of country currencies 
                                                             
12 BOMS' maturity was seven years and of the following symbiotic CDOs was four years. 
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 Source: Own Elaboration 
in the underlying pool. In this example is used a depreciation of 5%. Taking into 
account which microcredit is a risky investment, it is assumed a 12 % to the cost of 
capital.  
The administrative costs are assumed in 20% of the loan portfolio, following the 
World Bank (2002b) estimation that they lie in the 10-25% range, and conservatively 
are paid at the beginning of the loan. The CDO loans are independent of each other and 
have an average conservative default rate of 5%, once average default rates were 
reported in the range 1-5% (Byström; 2008). As in the Drug Research' case, this 
assumption of independence is not limitative for the MiCDO advantages.  However, in a 
more specific real-world case the default dependency has to be studied since it affects 
the return' standard deviation. To finalize the assumptions, it is assumed that all the 
loans have zero recovery rates, that is, if a borrower defaults, he has no collateral as 




Consequently the return of an isolated loan, as for the drug research example, 
follows a Bernoulli distribution. Six years after, its return is 122.67% or all the funds 
are lost (-100%) if the borrower defaults. (Figure A.12) 
However, as predicted, if we repackage a considerable number of loans, in this 
example, 10.000, the hypothesis of a lender to obtain a positive return enlarges to 
almost 100%. Nevertheless, the return only is higher than the cost of capital (12%) 
when the number of successful loans exceeds 8900. Moreover the pooling allows reduce 
the standard deviation 100 times (√               ). These fantastic results are 
achieved thanks to the independence of the collateral assets but are demonstrative of 
CDOs pooling potentialities. The IRR is expected to be 13.30% and each euro allocated 
generates a Net Present Value (NPV) of 4.69 cents. (Figure A.10, A.13 and Table A.XI)  
Figure 12. Hypothetical Loan Cash Flows (Microcredit) 
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Concluding, microcredit industry is characterized by short-term and small 
amount loans with high administrative costs. Consequently the individual microcredit 
commercialization is not profitable and has to be made in a large scale, being CDOs an 
interesting way out.  
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5. Conclusions and Limitations 
 This dissertation aims to understand and explain the contribution of CDOs to the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2010, identifying its main strengths and weaknesses. 
Afterward, it pretend perceive if its potentialities could be exploited without bring the 
curses shown previously.  
 To this end, were pointed, studied and deepened some possible CDOs 
applications. These applications could be untested; however the securitizations 
techniques are not and had given evidence of its capacity and attractiveness during the 
run-up to the financial crisis. Nevertheless these solutions still need to mature, to be 
studied deeper and some political will, given that with exception of microcredit they 
still remain on the paper. 
 ESBs and European Sovereign Debt need a change of mindset of European 
leaders and join the different wills and interests to end up with the existing lobbies, 
becoming Europe still more united. 
  In the biomedical research, still is necessary to solve legal issues and change 
mentalities to an active scientific collaboration. Subsequently, this project can go 
forward and seriously expand the current scale of biomedical innovation in a sustainable 
and profitable way.  
 The area of securitizing microloans is in its infancy and when someone wants to 
develop a future MiCDOs there are a number of issues, referred previously, that deserve 
to be raised. 
 The case studies presented may be little detailed due to the complexity and 
extent of the matters addressed. The simulations, in the Drug Research and in the 
Microcredit case, are simple. Moreover, they do not consider the correlation among 
assets. So, further investigation should be done to estimate it and to accurate 
assumptions taken. Concretely, in the biomedical research case, is needed to determine 
the optimal size for the megafund. In the microcredit could be studied alternative means 
to reduce the exchange rate risk and the volatility of interest rates.  
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 During the research, I realized that in the post-crisis stopped to consider CDOs 
as a mechanism to use, falling into disuse. I also stated a tendency of CDOs 
applications' post-crisis studies rename it using new terms as for example ESBs or 
RBOs, hindering my search for applications. Barnett-Hart (2009) even said "the CDO 
may be unequivocally dead". On the other hand, the work does not let into oblivion a 
product that has several potentialities because of the crisis. Structured finance and 
CDOs had, have and still could carry on a crucial role on economic growth. 
 Concluding, the work has a clear focus on the upcoming, gathering innovative 
solutions to the challenges some areas are facing today. The cases presented have in 
common the need to solve the lack of financing, and hardly will find a better solution 
than CDOs to them.   
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Figure A.3 Expected Loss' Formula  




Figure A.4 Credit Default Swap Mechanism  
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Figure A.1 Global CDO Issuance by Purpose, 2005-2012  
Balance Sheet
Arbitrage
 Source: Own Elaboration 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) 
Figure A.2 Share of CDOs in ABS issuance, in Europe (1996-2001) 
Source: Standard & Poor's 
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 Source: Own Elaboration 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Figure A.5 Ali Copula for the Joint distribution 
  - How many and which countries defaulted in the Independent Default Simulation "x" 
   - Country "i" enters in default 
P(A∩B)  → is the probability of simultaneous occurrence of A and B  
Ali et al (1978) Copula for the joint distribution →          
         
                     
  
P(B│A)  → is the probability of occur event B knowing of the occurrence of A 
Default dependent probability of Country "i", occurring "x"→           
           
                       
     
 
  
Figure A.6 Davis-Lo Adapted Contagion Model 





Figure A.7 Domino's Contagion Effect   
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Figure A.8 Dependency Process 
 
  
Figure A.9 Isolated Project Return Distribution (Drug Research) 
 
          
                                              
                         




                                 






Figure A.10 Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Formulas 
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Figure A.12 Isolated Loan Return Distribution (Microcredit) 
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Table A.I General Government Deficit in Percentage of GDP 
geo\year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Euro area   -2.6  -3.1  -2.9  -2.5  -1.3  -0.7  -2.1  -6.3  -6.2  -4.1  -3.7   
Belgium  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -2.5  0.4  -0.1  -1 -5.5  -3.8  -3.7  -3.9   
Germany  -3.8  -4.2  -3.8  -3.3  -1.6  0.2  -0.1  -3.1  -4.1  -0.8  0.2   
Estonia  0.3  1.7  1.6  1.6  2.5  2.4  -2.9  -2 0.2  1.1  -0.3   
Ireland  -0.4  0.4  1.4  1.7  2.9  0.1  -7.4  -13.9  -30.9  -13.4  -7.6   
Greece  -4.8  -5.6  -7.5  -5.2  -5.7  -6.5  -9.8  -15.6  -10.7  -9.4  -10.0   
Spain  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1  1.3  2.4  1.9  -4.5  -11.2  -9.7  -9.4  -10.6   
France  -3.1  -4.1  -3.6  -2.9  -2.3  -2.7  -3.3  -7.5  -7.1  -5.2  -4.8   
Italy  -3.1  -3.6  -3.5  -4.4  -3.4  -1.6  -2.7  -5.4  -4.5  -3.9  -3.0   
Cyprus  -4.4  -6.6  -4.1  -2.4  -1.2  3.5  0.9  -6.1  -5.3  -6.3  -6.3   
Luxembourg  2.1  0.5  -1.1  0 1.4  3.7  3.2  -0.8  -0.8  -0.3  -0.8   
Malta  -5.8  -9.2  -4.7  -2.9  -2.8  -2.3  -4.6  -3.9  -3.6  -2.7  -3.3   
Netherlands  -2.1  -3.1  -1.7  -0.3  0.5  0.2  0.5  -5.6  -5.1  -4.5  -4.1   
Austria  -0.7  -1.5  -4.4  -1.7  -1.5  -0.9  -0.9  -4.1  -4.5  -2.5  -2.5   
Portugal  -3.4  -3.7  -4 -6.5  -4.6  -3.1  -3.6  -10.2  -9.8  -4.4  -6.4   
Slovenia  -2.4  -2.7  -2.3  -1.5  -1.4  0 -1.9  -6 -5.7  -6.4  -4.0   
Slovakia  -8.2  -2.8  -2.4  -2.8  -3.2  -1.8  -2.1  -8 -7.7  -4.9  -4.3   
Finland  4.2  2.6  2.5  2.9  4.2  5.3  4.4  -2.5  -2.5  -0.6  -1.9   
Source: Eurostat 
Table A.II General Government Gross Debt in Percentage of GDP 
geo\year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Euro area   66.89 68.32 68.64 69.44 67.95 65.81 69.30 78.89 84.24 85.7 90.6 
Belgium  103.4 98.4 94 92 88 84 89.2 95.7 95.5 97.8 99.6  
Germany  60.7 64.4 66.2 68.5 68 65.2 66.8 74.5 82.5 80.5 81.9  
Estonia  5.7 5.6 5 4.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 7.2 6.7 6.1 10.1  
Ireland  32 30.7 29.5 27.3 24.6 25.1 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4 117.6  
Greece  101.7 97.4 98.6 100 106.1 107.4 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6 156.9  
Spain  52.6 48.8 46.3 43.2 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 84.2  
France  58.8 62.9 64.9 66.4 63.7 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 86 90.2  
Italy  105.1 103.9 103.4 105.7 106.3 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.2 120.7 127.0  
Cyprus  65.1 69.7 70.9 69.4 64.7 58.8 48.9 58.5 61.3 71.1 85.8  
Luxembourg  6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.7 14.4 15.3 19.2 18.3 20.8  
Malta  59.1 67.6 71.7 69.7 64 61.9 62 67.6 68.3 70.9 72.1  
Netherlands  50.5 52 52.4 51.8 47.4 45.3 58.5 60.8 63.1 65.5 71.2  
Austria  66.2 65.3 64.7 64.2 62.3 60.2 63.8 69.2 72 72.4 73.4  
Portugal  56.8 59.4 61.9 67.7 69.4 68.4 71.7 83.2 93.5 108.1 123.6  
Slovenia  27.8 27.2 27.3 26.7 26.4 23.1 22 35 38.6 46.9 54.1  
Slovakia  43.4 42.4 41.5 34.2 30.5 29.6 27.9 35.6 41 43.3 52.1  
Finland  41.5 44.5 44.4 41.7 39.6 35.2 33.9 43.5 48.6 49 53.0  
Source: Eurostat 




Table A.III Euro-zone 10 years Yields* Correlation Matrix 
 
BEL DEU IRL GR ESP FR ITA CYP LUX MLT NL AUS PT SLN SLK FIN EST 
Belgium 1 0.82 0.10 0.37 0.15 0.93 0.38 0.10 0.81 0.83 0.88 0.93 -0.14 0.43 0.77 0.88 N\A 
Germany 0.82 1 -0.37 -0.77 -0.27 0.97 -0.12 -0.16 0.79 0.78 0.99 0.95 -0.63 0.22 0.61 0.98 N\A 
Ireland 0.10 -0.37 1 0.68 0.65 -0.22 0.59 0.23 -0.08 -0.08 -0.30 -0.20 0.80 0.11 0.04 -0.29 N\A 
Greece 0.37 -0.77 0.68 1 0.74 -0.61 0.64 0.46 -0.53 -0.37 -0.72 -0.63 0.94 0.16 -0.14 -0.72 N\A 
Spain 0.15 -0.27 0.65 0.74 1 -0.08 0.89 0.63 -0.03 0.17 -0.20 -0.12 0.78 0.48 0.4 -0.20 N\A 
France 0.93 0.97 -0.22 -0.61 -0.08 1 0.12 -0.03 0.84 0.85 0.98 0.99 -0.44 0.35 0.73 0.98 N\A 
Italy 0.38 -0.12 0.59 0.64 0.89 0.12 1 0.6 0.13 0.28 -0.03 0.09 0.75 0.53 0.51 -0.02 N\A 
Cyprus 0.10 -0.16 0.23 0.46 0.63 -0.03 0.6 1 -0.16 0.34 -0.13 -0.07 0.5 0.31 0.52 -0.11 N\A 
Luxembourg 0.81 0.79 -0.08 -0.53 -0.03 0.84 0.13 -0.16 1 0.7 0.85 0.87 -0.39 0.2 0.62 0.86 N\A 
Malta 0.83 0.78 -0.08 -0.37 0.17 0.85 0.28 0.34 0.7 1 0.81 0.83 -0.23 0.66 0.87 0.82 N\A 
Netherlands 0.88 0.99 -0.30 -0.72 -0.20 0.98 -0.03 -0.13 0.85 0.81 1 0.98 -0.57 0.26 0.66 1 N\A 
Austria 0.93 0.95 -0.20 -0.63 -0.12 0.99 0.09 -0.07 0.87 0.83 0.98 1 -0.46 0.31 0.72 0.99 N\A 
Portugal -0.14 -0.63 0.80 0.94 0.78 -0.44 0.75 0.5 -0.39 -0.23 -0.57 -0.46 1 0.22 0 -0.56 N\A 
Slovenia 0.43 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.48 0.35 0.53 0.31 0.2 0.66 0.26 0.31 0.22 1 0.81 0.27 N\A 
Slovakia 0.77 0.61 0.04 -0.14 0.4 0.73 0.51 0.52 0.62 0.87 0.66 0.72 0 0.81 1 0.67 N\A 
Finland 0.88 0.98 -0.29 -0.72 -0.20 0.98 -0.02 -0.11 0.86 0.82 1 0.99 -0.56 0.27 0.67 1 N\A 
Estonia** N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A 
 
Table A.IV Alphanumerical Ratings and Respective Cumulative 10 years Default Rate 
Countries Ratings (Moody's) C. D. Rate 10 years 
Austria Aaa 0.19% 
Belgium Aa3 0.98% 
Cyprus Caa3 79.99% 
Estonia A1 2.13% 
Finland Aaa 0.19% 
France Aaa 0.19% 
Germany Aaa 0.19% 
Greece C 80.30% 
Ireland Ba1 14.07% 
Italy Baa2 4.86% 
Luxembourg Aaa 0.19% 
Netherlands Aaa 0.19% 
Portugal Ba3 30.42% 
Slovak A2 2.99% 
Slovenia Baa2 4.86% 
Spain Baa3 7.13% 
Malta A3 2.84% 
Source: Moody's (Extraction Date 04/03/2013) 
* Monthly data since the euro introduction until March 2013 
** ECB does not provide the 10 year Estonia Sovereign Debt yield given that there is a modest outstanding debt 
Source: European Central Bank (Extraction Date 04/04/2013) 
 




Table A.V CDO Composition in the Year 2014 
Countries ESB (2014) M€ Weights 
Austria 190011.6071 3.20% 
Belgium 233482.5147 3.93% 
Cyprus 11155.58891 0.19% 
Estonia 10045.13121 0.17% 
Finland 118905.6535 2.00% 
France 1262053.915 21.26% 
Germany 1630577.369 27.47% 
Greece 132243.9943 2.23% 
Ireland 102689.5711 1.73% 
Italy 992353.721 16.72% 
Luxembourg 26538.87576 0.45% 
Netherlands 378200.9583 6.37% 
Portugal 107184.8587 1.81% 
Slovak 43936.81468 0.74% 
Slovenia 22671.5338 0.38% 
Spain 669881.0834 11.28% 
Malta 4163.990351 0.07% 
 
5936097.18 100% 
Source: Own Calculation 
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Table A.VI One Simulation to the Independent Default Case 
 










Austria 0.19% 0.89 NO 190011.61 49.30% 0 
Belgium 0.98% 0.34 NO 233482.51 49.30% 0 
Cyprus 79.99% 0.70 YES 11155.59 49.30% 5655.88 
Estonia 2.13% 0.97 NO 10045.13 49.30% 0 
Finland 0.19% 0.81 NO 118905.65 49.30% 0 
France 0.19% 0.21 NO 1262053.91 49.30% 0 
Germany 0.19% 0.41 NO 1630577.37 49.30% 0 
Greece 80.30% 0.97 NO 132243.99 49.30% 0 
Ireland 14.07% 0.60 NO 102689.57 49.30% 0 
Italy 4.86% 0.92 NO 992353.72 49.30% 0 
Luxembourg 0.19% 0.12 NO 26538.88 49.30% 0 
Netherlands 0.19% 0.30 NO 378200.96 49.30% 0 
Portugal 30.42% 0.38 NO 107184.86 49.30% 0 
Slovak 2.99% 0.95 NO 43936.81 49.30% 0 
Slovenia 4.86% 0.84 NO 22671.53 49.30% 0 
Spain 7.13% 0.02 YES 669881.08 49.30% 339629.71 
Malta 2.84% 0.95 NO 4163.99 49.30% 0 
 
 
Table A.VII Euro-zone 10 years CDS Daily Prices* Correlation Matrix 
 
AUS BEL CYP EST FIN FR DEU GR IRL ITA LUX NL PT SLK SLN ESP MLT 
Austria 1 0,89 0,77 0,29 0,86 0,88 0,63 0,85 0,70 0,80 N\A 0,88 0,69 0,72 0,73 0,86 0,91 
Belgium 0,89 1 0,77 0,28 0,90 0,92 0,60 0,89 0,78 0,79 N\A 0,92 0,74 0,74 0,76 0,92 0,90 
Cyprus 0,77 0,77 1 0,67 0,84 0,84 0,58 0,77 0,39 0,75 N\A 0,84 0,58 0,87 0,86 0,87 0,91 
Estonia 0,29 0,28 0,67 1 0,49 0,48 0,39 0,22 -0,07 0,33 N\A 0,43 0,31 0,71 0,70 0,45 0,45 
Finland 0,86 0,90 0,84 0,49 1 0,93 0,66 0,84 0,57 0,68 N\A 0,90 0,68 0,82 0,81 0,89 0,87 
France 0,88 0,92 0,84 0,48 0,93 1 0,65 0,86 0,64 0,76 N\A 0,92 0,73 0,83 0,84 0,92 0,91 
Germany 0,63 0,60 0,58 0,39 0,66 0,65 1 0,71 0,43 0,62 N\A 0,76 0,67 0,57 0,59 0,69 0,63 
Greece 0,85 0,89 0,77 0,22 0,84 0,86 0,71 1 0,67 0,78 N\A 0,88 0,73 0,69 0,70 0,91 0,88 
Ireland 0,70 0,78 0,39 -0,07 0,57 0,64 0,43 0,67 1 0,75 N\A 0,68 0,84 0,36 0,39 0,71 0,67 
Italy 0,80 0,79 0,75 0,33 0,68 0,76 0,62 0,78 0,75 1 N\A 0,83 0,79 0,62 0,64 0,89 0,90 
Luxembourg N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A N\A 
Netherlands 0,88 0,92 0,84 0,43 0,90 0,92 0,76 0,88 0,68 0,83 N\A 1 0,76 0,79 0,81 0,93 0,92 
Portugal 0,69 0,74 0,58 0,31 0,68 0,73 0,67 0,73 0,84 0,79 N\A 0,76 1 0,59 0,59 0,83 0,74 
Slovakia 0,72 0,74 0,87 0,71 0,82 0,83 0,57 0,69 0,36 0,62 N\A 0,79 0,59 1 0,98 0,79 0,80 
Slovenia 0,73 0,76 0,86 0,70 0,81 0,84 0,59 0,70 0,39 0,64 N\A 0,81 0,59 0,98 1 0,79 0,80 
Spain 0,86 0,92 0,87 0,45 0,89 0,92 0,69 0,91 0,71 0,89 N\A 0,93 0,83 0,79 0,79 1 0,96 





 Source: Own Elaboration 
* Common days since 2004 until the extraction date 
Source: Bloomberg  (Extraction Date 28/06/2013) 
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 Source: Own Elaboration 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Table A.VIII Using the Default Correlation Matrix to Generate Correlated Random 
Numbers (Steps) 
Steps: 
1-Do the Eigen decomposition of the default correlation matrix (used for a negative or 
positive matrix; squared or not squared) 
1.1 -Numerical computation of Eigen values 
1.2- Numerical computation of Eigen vectors 
1.3- Obtain the Decomposed Matrix 
2- Generate random numbers that follow a Uniform Distribution (0;1) 
3- Obtain the correlated Random Numbers 
3.1-Multiply the numbers by the decomposed matrix correlation 




Source: Grabowski et al (2002) 
 
Table A.X Number of Cases of Success and Respective Return to 100 Projects 
Cases of Success 0 1 2 3 … 8 9 10 11 … 100 
Annual Return (%) -100% -5,94% -0,35% 3,07% … 11,85% 12,95% 13,95% 14,86% … 38,05% 
Probability  0,00% 0,03% 0,16% 0,59% … 11,48% 13,04% 13,19% 11,99% … 0,00% 





Table A.XI Number of Cases of Success and Respective Return to 10000 Loans 
Cases of Success 0 … 4500 … 8900 … 9400 9500 9600 … 10000 
 Annual Return (%) -100% … 0.03% … 12.07% … 13.10% 13.30% 13.50% … 14.27% 
Probability  0.00% … 0.00% … 0.72% … 15.00% 18.00% 17.81% … 0.59% 
Cumulative Prob.  0.00% … 0.00% … 1.15% … 38.40% 56.40% 74.22% … 100% 
 
 Source: Own Elaboration 
Table A.IX Mean Industry Returns and Cost-of-Capital for Different Time Periods of 
New Chemical Entities (NCES) 




















1990-94   11.6%   11.0% 
